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RESTATING THE OBVIOUS IN MARYLAND PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY LAW: THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
PRODUCTS liABIUTY AND FAILURE TO 
WARN DEFENSES 
Rebecca Korzect 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Products liability doctrine has struggled to balance the competing 
interests of product safety with those of product development and in-
novation. I Manufacturer defenses are at the center of the dynamic 
and controversial debates in contemporary products liability law.2 An 
increasingly important inquiry centers on the availability of defenses 
in failure-ta-warn cases.3 These defenses include the bulk supplier, 
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1. See generally John E. Montgomery & David G. Owen, Reflections on the Theory 
and Administration of Strict Liahility for Defective Products, 27 S.C. L. REv. 803 
(1976). 
2. See generally John Attanasio, The Principle of Aggregate Autonomy and the 
Calabresian Approach to Products Liahility, 74 VA. L. REv. 677 (1988). 
3. See, e.g., Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limita-
tions, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1193, 1206-57 (1994) (discussing reasons why con-
sumers fail to read, comprehend, remember or follow even "good" 
warnings). Professor Latin argues that defective warning analysis "raises, in 
perhaps its most striking form, the fundamental question whether manu-
facturers or consumers should bear the primary responsibility for accident 
prevention in product-use settings." [d. at 1197. For an interesting critique 
of Professor Latin's article, see Kenneth Ian Weissman, A "Comment]" Parry 
to Howard Latin s "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 70 
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 629 (1996). See also 2 AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE, Re-
porter's Study: Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury-Approaches 
to Legal and Institutional Change 66 (1991) [hereinafter "ALI Reporter's 
Study"] ("Not only is complete safety unachievable, but it is inconsistent 
with a serious interest in warning issues. This interest presupposes a com-
mitment to individual autonomy-within limits, to letting informed people 
decide for themselves what products to buy and how to use products."). 
American products liability traditionally defines three types of defects: man-
ufacturing defects, design defects and marketing defects (failure to warn). 
See, e.g., David Fischer, Product Liahility-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. 
REv. 339 (1974). 
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learned intermediary, and sophisticated user defenses,4 and flow from 
the obvious danger rule-the concept being that the duty to warn 
does not extend to known, patent or obvious dangers. 5 
Typically, these defenses are available in cases involving the sale of 
goods to knowledgeable consumers or other sophisticated buyers, 
such as other manufacturers.6 As a member of the same trade or in-
dustry as the ultimate product user, the manufacturer appreciates the 
dangerous characteristics of its product.7 Nevertheless, the manufac-
turer does not have a duty to warn the ultimate product users because 
these users already possess actual or constructive knowledge of the 
product's dangers.8 For example, an industrial customer may 
4. Some courts reject the sophisticated user, learned intermediary and bulk 
supplier doctrines. See, e.g., Whitehead v. St. Joe Lead Co., 729 F.2d 238, 
252-54 (3d Cir. 1984) (refusing to apply the bulk supplier doctrine); Hall v. 
Ashland Oil Co., 625 F. Supp. 1515, 1519-21 (D. Conn. 1986) (refusing to 
apply the learned intermediary doctrine to employer-employee relation-
ships). Still other courts hold that whether manufacturers should directly 
warn ultimate users is a factual question. See McCullock v. H.B. Fuller, 981 
F.2d 656, 658 (2d Cir. 1992) (applying Vermont law to hold that a glue 
manufacturer had a duty to warn book bindery employees directly of dan-
gers of prolonged inhalation of glue vapor); Bryant v. Technical Research 
Co., 654 F.2d 1337, 1348 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that bulk suppliers 
should obtain their distributor's customer list to provide direct warnings). 
5. SeeJonescue v.Jewel Home Shopping Serv., 306 N.E.2d 312, 316 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1973) ("[T]he purpose of a warning is to apprise a party of a danger of 
which he is not aware, and thus enable him to protect himself against it."); 
see also Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 543-44, 332 A2d 11, 15 (1975). 
A related concern in warnings cases is that "excessive warnings on product 
labels may be counterproductive, causing 'sensory overload' that literally 
drowns crucial information in a sea of mind-numbing detail." Aetna Cas. & 
Sur. Co. v. Ralph Wilson Plastics Co., 509 N.W.2d 520, 523 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1993). See generally AD. Twerski et aI., The Use and Abuse of Warning in Prod-
ucts Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 495, 
514-16 (1976). 
6. See Higgins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours, 671 F. Supp. 1055, 1058-62 (D. Md. 
1975) (holding that bulk supplier/sophisticated user defense applied when 
the manufacturer was DuPont, a knowledgeable industrial purchaser); see 
also Hall, 625 F. Supp. at 1516 (noting that the defendant raised knowledge-
able user exception in a situation involving an industrial customer); Good-
bar v. Whitehead Bros., 591 F. Supp. 552,561 (W.D. Va. 1984) (ruling that 
under Virginia law, suppliers of silica-containing products did not have a 
duty to advise employees of dangers when the purchaser-employer clearly 
knew of the dangers). 
7. See generally R. Robert Stomrol & Dina M. Cox, Recent Developments in the 
Indiana Law of Product Liability, 32 IND. L. REv. 927, 938-42 (1999) (com-
menting that a manufacturer has no duty to warn the ultimate consumer if 
the manufacturer can apply the sophisticated user doctrine); Mark M. Ha-
ger, Don't Say I Didn't Warn You (Even Though I Didn't): Why the Pro-Defendant 
Consensus on Warning Law is Wrong, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1125, 1160-61 (1994) 
(criticizing the sophisticated user doctrine for creating problems of fair-
ness, efficiency, and justice). 
8. See Kennedy v. Mobay, 84 Md. App. 397,427,579 A2d 1191, 1206 (1990); 
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. j (1998) 
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]. 
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purchase the producing manufacturer's product for use in its own 
manufacturing process. Although aware of the product's dangers, this 
industrial buyer may, nevertheless, supply the product to its employ-
ees without warning them. If the product subsequently injures an em-
ployee, that employee frequently will sue both his employer9 and the 
producing manufacturer. Consequently, the producing manufacturer 
or seller will likely defend the user's products liability claim on one of 
two theories. First, no obligation to warn exists because the injured 
employee already understood the product's hazards without the ne-
cessity of a seller warning or instruction. lO In the alternative, the orig-
inal seller may argue that any duty to warn rested with an intervening 
seller or the employer itself. 11 
In such situations, the learned intermediary, bulk supplier and so-
phisticated user doctrines provide the manufacturer with a defense in 
products liability failure-to-warn cases. Fundamentally, these doc-
trines are premised on basic products liability no-duty rules-manu-
facturers have no duty to warn professional users and their employees 
of product risks because these users already comprehend the product 
risks. 12 Thus, the initial inquiry is whether the purchaser is a sophisti-
cated user or learned intermediary, thereby obviating the duty to 
warn. 
While embracing the generally accepted doctrine that a product 
user should be warned of latent defects and dangers, the obvious dan-
ger rule is premised upon the idea that it would be wasteful to provide 
instructions or warnings already known by the product user. 13 The 
obvious danger rule has further support from the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts: Products Liability ("Restatement (Third)"): 
In general, a product seller is not subject to liability for fail-
ing to warn or instruct regarding risks and risk-avoidance 
measures should be obvious to, or generally known by, fore-
seeable product users. When a risk is obvious or generally 
9. The suit against the employer is a worker's compensation action, offering 
limited monetary recovery. See, e.g., C & K Lord, Inc. v. Carter, 74 Md. App. 
68,74-75,536 A.2d 669, 702 (1988). 
10. See infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text. 
11. See infra notes 47-54 and accompanying text. 
12. See Bartkewich v. Billinger, 247 A.2d 603, 606 (Pa. 1968) (stating "we hardly 
believe it is anymore necessary to tell an experienced factory worker that he 
should not put his hand into a machine that is at that moment breaking 
glass than it would be necessary to tell a zookeeper to keep his head out of 
a hippopotamus' mouth"). But see Campos v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 
485 A.2d 305, 311 (NJ. 1984) (stating that an experienced mechanic 
should be reminded of tire rim mismatch dangers although he had already 
experienced a similar injury). 
13. See Marshall S. Shapo, Products Liability: The Next Act, 26 HOFSTRA L. REv. 
761, 768 (1998); see also infra Part III.A. See generally MARsHALL S. SHAPO, 
THE LAw OF PRODUCTS LIABIUTI §§ 19.01-19.14 (3d ed. 1994 & Supp. 
1997). 
344 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 30 
known, the prospective addressee of a warning will or should 
already know of its existence. Warning of obvious or gener-
ally known risk in most instances will not provide an effective 
additional measure of safety. Furthermore, warnings that 
deal with obvious or generally known risks may be ignored by 
users and consumers and may diminish the significance of 
warnings about non-obvious, not-generally-known risks. 
Thus requiring warnings of obvious or generally known risks 
could reduce the efficacy of warnings generally.14 
American products liability law does not recognize a duty to warn of 
obvious dangers. Because the purpose of warnings is to reduce prod-
uct risks, Professors Henderson and Twerski, the Reporters to the Re-
statement (Third), have called the "no duty to warn of obvious danger" 
rule "beyond reproach."15 If reasonable persons differ on the ques-
tion of the obviousness of the danger, the issue is for the trier of 
fact.16 The Restatement (Third) supports this positionP 
The bulk supplier, learned intermediary, and sophisticated user de-
fenses raise central issues about the nature and purpose of product 
warnings. When judges and lawyers treat these defenses as one doc-
trine, failing to distinguish differences in them, difficulties arise. Con-
solidating these defenses obscures the significant distinctions between 
the doctrines because they present completely distinct factual settings. 
In the case of the bulk supplier and learned intermediary defenses, 
the duty to instruct or to warn is delegated to an equally knowledgea-
ble, but more directly positioned, warning party. In the case of the 
sophisticated user defense, no duty to warn exists because the user 
already appreciates the product dangers. 
Significant policy considerations may exist for permitting the manu-
facturer to fulfill its warning obligations by providing information to 
its immediate vendee rather than directly to the ultimate user. These 
rationales, however, deserve cogent and thoughtful articulation. 
More importantly, as a defense, the doctrine must be clearly distin-
guished from the plaintiff's initial obligation to prove a defect. The 
first setting deals with the delegability of a manufacturer's duty to 
warn. As such, the doctrine actually provides a defense. The sophisti-
cated user doctrine, however, implicates the more basic issue of the 
very existence of a product defect. As a result, this Article argues that 
this doctrine should not be viewed as a defense at all. Simply stated, 
the sophisticated user already knows the product danger, obviating 
14. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. j. 
15. JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. AND AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS LIABILI1Y: 
PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 344 (4th ed. 2000). 
16. See, e.g., Stanley v. Aeroquip Corp., 181 F.3d 103 (6th Cir. 1999). 
17. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt.j ("When reasonable minds may differ as to 
whether the risk was obvious, or generally known, the issue is to be decided 
by the trier of fact."). 
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the necessity of a manufacturer warning. These doctrines seem to in-
dicate that the product is not defective for lack of a warning to the 
ultimate product user. Nevertheless, it is common to refer to these 
doctrines as the learned intermediary, bulk seller, or sophisticated 
user "defenses." Because user knowledge goes to the heart of proving 
product defect, it should be part of the plaintiffs prima facie case. IS 
The promulgation of the Restatement (Thirdl 9 mandates a reexami-
nation of basic products liability issues. For example, courts applying 
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts ("Restatement (Second),,), 
have questioned the validity of these defenses in strict liability, as op-
posed to negligence-based, failure-to-warn cases.20 Analyzing these is-
sues permits a better understanding of whether the Restatement (Third) 
improves or clarifies the current standard. 
The related defenses of the bulk supplier, the sophisticated user 
and the learned intermediary form the topic of discussion in this Arti-
cle because these doctrines cast the competing rights and duties of 
product manufacturers, health-care providers, and product users in 
sharp contrast. The issuance by the American Law Institute (ALI) of a 
Restatement of Products Liability offers an ideal opportunity to reexam-
ine Maryland products liability doctrine. 
This Article will examine these warning doctrines from several per-
spectives. Part II presents a historical overview of these issues.21 Part 
III examines Maryland law on the duty to warn.22 Part IV discusses the 
Restatement (Second)'s adoption of the sophisticated user defense.23 Fi-
nally, Part V evaluates the Restatement (Third)'s contribution to these 
failure-to-warn or informational defenses.24 
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
The general rule in products liability law is that the product seller 
must provide the ultimate user all necessary warnings and instructions 
to prevent the product from being defectively dangerous.25 Failure to 
warn may be based on either negligence or strict liability.26 Under 
either theory, the product seller or manufacturer must warn the ulti-
mate user of product dangers that can cause foreseeable harm.27 
18. See generally supra notes 8, 10, 12-13 and accompanying text. 
19. See AAJJ Wraps Up Products Liability Project, New UCC Article on Licenses Makes 
Debut, 65 U.S.L.w. 2777, June 3, 1997. 
20. See infra Part II.B. 
21. See infra Part II. 
22. See infra Part III. 
23. See infra Part IV. 
24. See infra Part V.C. 
25. See DeChello v. Johnson Enters., 74 Md. App. 228, 235, 536 A.2d 1203, 1207 
(1988); Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227, 1231 (1984). 
26. See Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Garrett, 343 Md. 500, 682 A.2d 1143 
(1996). 
27. See Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 543, 332 A.2d 11, 15 (1975). 
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Generally, the duty to warn requires the seller to have actual or con-
structive knowledge of the product hazards.28 If the product user also 
has actual knowledge of such product dangers, the seller has no duty 
to warn.29 
A. Duty to Warn in Negligence Actions 
Any discussion of these defenses must begin with the landmark case 
of Littlehale v. E.!. DuPont de Nemours CO.,30 a products liability sophisti-
cated user action brought in negligence rather than in strict liability. 
In Littlehale, the district court concluded that "there need be no warn-
ing to one in a particular trade or profession against a danger gener-
ally known to that trade or profession."31 Consequently, absent a duty 
to warn the product purchaser, there is no duty to warn an employee 
of that purchaser.32 The Littlehale court based its decision on the lan-
guage found in comment k to Restatement (Second) section 388, which 
provides that a manufacturer has no duty to warn product users of 
dangers if the manufacturer has reason to expect that such product 
users will discover and comprehend the dangers.33 In other words, no 
28. See Dudley v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 98 Md. App. 182, 198, 632 A.2d 
492,500 (1993). 
29. See generally Latin, supra note 3. 
30. 268 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), affd, 380 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1967). 
31. [d. at 798. 
32. [d. at 799. 
33. Section 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts ("Restatement (Second)"), enti-
tled "Chattel Known to Be Dangerous for Intended Use," provides: 
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for 
another to use is subject to liability to those whom the supplier 
should expect to use the chattel with the consent of the other or to 
be endangered by its probable use, for physical harm caused by the 
use of the chattel in the manner for which and by a person for 
whose use it is supplied, if the supplier 
(a) knows or had reason to know that the chattel is or is likely 
to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, and 
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chat-
tel is supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and 
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dan-
gerous condition or of the facts which make it likely to be 
dangerous. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965) [hereinafter "RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND)"]; see also Lockett v. Gen. Elec. Co., 376 F. Supp. 1201, 1205 (E.D. 
Pa. 1974) (discussing section 388). Section 402A of the Restatement (Second), 
entitled "Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or 
Consumer," provides: 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasona-
bly dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is 
subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ulti-
mate user or consumer, or to his property, if 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a prod-
uct, and 
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duty to warn exists where any potential product dangers are obvious 
or patent. 
B. Distinguishing Negligence-Based and Strict Liability-Based Failure-to-
Warn Actions 
Failure-to-warn cases, like manufacturing and design defect actions, 
usually include claims sounding both in negligence and strict liabil-
ity.34 Courts continue, however, to debate the question of whether 
any significant distinction exists between negligence-based and strict 
liability-based duty to warn actions.35 Although some courts conclude 
that a m;l.llufacturer's duty to warn under section 402A of the Restate-
ment (SecondJ6 is separate and distinct from its duty to warn under a 
negligence theory,37 most jurisdictions maintain that a manufacturer's 
duty to warn under either section 388 negligence or section 402A 
strict liability analysis is substantially identica1.38 These jurisdictions 
analyze failure-to-warn cases in terms of "reasonableness," a negli-
gence concept.39 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer 
without substantial change in the condition in which it was 
sold; 
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although 
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation 
and sale of his product, and 
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or 
entered into any contractual relation with the seller. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A. 
34. Warranty claims may also be available. See, e.g., DeChello v. Johnson En-
ters., 74 Md. App. 228, 235, 536 A.2d 1203, 1207 (1988) (quoting Hayes v. 
Ariens Co., 391 Mass. 407, 462 N.E.2d 273, 277, em. denied, 312 Md. 601, 
541 A.2d 964 (1988) ("if foreseeable users are not adequately warned of 
dangers associated with its use" the product is not merchantable)). 
35. See Battersby v. Boyer, 526 S.E.2d 159, 162 (Ga. App. 1999) (distinguishing 
between negligent failure to warn and strict liability); Ragin v. Porter Hay-
den Co., 133 Md. App. 116, 154,706 A.2d 503, 524 (2000) (remanding case 
to determine "whether the continuing duty to warn was included as part of 
the negligence or strict liability claim"); Mazda v. Ragowski, 105 Md. App. 
318,325,659 A.2d 391, 394 (1995) (rejecting Mazda's argument that "there 
is no difference between a claim of negligence and a claim of strict liability 
in tort based on failure to warn"); O'Flynn v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas, 759 
So. 2d 526, 534 (Miss. 2000) ("Mississippi strict liability followed a negli-
gence based approach after adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 402A."). 
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A. 
37. See, e.g., Higgins v. E.I. DuPont Nemours, 671 F. Supp. 1055, 1059 (D. Md. 
1975) (discussing W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 
§ 49, at 697 (5th ed. 1984)). For a recent case offering an interesting dis-
cussion of the distinction between the implied warranty of merchantability 
and strict liability in tort see Denny v. Fard Motar Co., 662 N.E.2d 730, 734-36 
(N.Y. 1995). 
38. See, e.g., Rainbow v. Albert Elia Bldg. Co., 373 N.Y.S.2d 928, 931 (1975). 
39. Id. 
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Analysis of these doctrinal issues must consider whether differences 
exist between the Restatement (Second)'s negligence and strict liability 
provisions. As defined by section 388, a manufacturer is liable to an 
injured product user when "the manufacturer knew or in the exercise 
of ordinary care should have known" of the potential hazards.40 By 
contrast, section 402A provides that a manufacturer is strictly liable 
for selling a product "in a defective condition unreasonably danger-
ous to the user or consumer" even though the seller has exercised all 
possible reasonable careY Comment j of section 402A states that a 
seller may prevent a product from being unreasonably dangerous by 
providing directions or warnings.42 At the same time, commentj also 
suggests that the manufacturer has a duty to warn only if the manufac-
turer could reasonably foresee the product's danger.43 
Because the language of commentj uses the term "reasonably,"44 a 
term that connotes negligence, questions arise as to whether actual 
substantive differences exist between a manufacturer's duty to warn 
under section 388 as opposed to section 402A. In addition, there re-
mains substantial disagreement about whether foreseeability, a negli-
gence requirement,45 is an element in a strict liability duty to warn 
case. Many courts have concluded that the two forms of action are 
essentially identical, in the sense that both are negligence-based. Dis-
tinctions exist, however, in the limited availability of strict liability 
defenses.46 
C. Determining Manufacturer Liability 
Courts employ a variety of approaches in determining manufac-
turer liability for failure to warn ultimate users of product dangers. 
These approaches include: the bright-line duty, reasonableness test 
doctrine and the product-oriented approach. 
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 388. 
41. [d. § 402A. 
42. [d. § 402A cmt. j. 
43. [d. 
44. [d. 
45. Cedar Falls v. Cedar Falls Cmty. School Dist., 617 N.W.2d 11, 17 (Iowa 
2000) (stating that the foreseeability of the harm flowing from the actor's 
conduct is used to determine the cause-in-fact component of negligence); 
Williams v. Baltimore, 359 Md. 101, 143-44, 753 A.2d 41, 64 (2000) (discuss-
ing the importance of foreseeability in terms of negligence); Lopez v. 
Three Rivers Elec. Corp., 26 S.W.3d 151, 156 (Mo. 2000) (stating that fore-
seeability is used to determine if a duty exists). 
46. See Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 857-58 (4th Cir. 1980), eert. denied, 
449 U.S. 1080 (1981); Payne v. Soft Sheen Prods., Inc., 486A.2d 712, 721-22 
& n.9 (D.C. 1985). 
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1. Bright-Line Duty 
Some courts apply the "bright-line duty" test under which a seller 
has no duty to warn the ultimate user when intermediate purchasers 
are knowledgeable of the product's dangers.47 In many respects this 
approach to the sophisticated user defense is based on a self-evident 
tort proposition: without a duty, there can be no breach and there-
fore, no liability.48 Clearly, this approach focuses on the intermedi-
ary's knowledge, rather than on the reasonableness of the 
manufacturer's conduct.49 
2. Reasonableness Test 
Other courts focus more attention on the factors in comment n,50 
testing the reasonableness of the manufacturer's reliance on the inter-
mediate purchaser as a conduit of product safety information.51 If, 
after weighing these factors, it appears that the manufacturer reasona-
bly relied on a knowledgeable intermediate purchaser to convey prod-
uct safety information to ultimate users, these courts conclude that 
there is no duty to directly warn ultimate users.52 Undisputed facts 
concerning the ultimate purchaser'S actual or constructive knowledge 
47. 
48. 
49. 
50. 
51. 
52. 
See Acoba v. Gen. Tire Corp., 986 P.2d 288, 296 (Haw. 1999) (holding that 
Arenato Romero was an experienced tire repairman and, in the absence of 
any evidence to show that he was not knowledgeable of the dangers in the 
repair and with regard to multi-piece rims, the defendant did not have a 
duty to warn); Steinbarth v. Otis Elevator Co., 703 N.Y.S.2d 417, 417 (N.Y. 
2000) (stating that defendant has no duty to warn a knowledgeable user). 
But see Kennedy v. Mobay, 84 Md. App. 397, 413, 579 A.2d 1191, 1199 
(1990) (adopting a case-by-case approach instead of the bright-line rule). 
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 4; see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND 
KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 30, at 164 (5th ed. 1984). 
Cook v. Branick Mfg., Inc., 736 F.2d 1442, 1446 (11th Cir. 1984) (stating 
that the duty to warn "is discharged by informing the employer of the dan-
gerous condition," and warning each of the employees "then becomes the 
responsibility of the employer"); Guidry v. Kern Mfg. Co., 693 F.2d 426, 430-
31 (5th Cir. 1982); Marshall v. H.K. Ferguson Co., 623 F.2d 882,886-87 (4th 
Cir. 1980) (manufacturer of brewing equipment had no duty to warn brew-
ery employee of hazards in the use of the equipment where those hazards 
were open and obvious to the employer-brewery); Younger v. Dow Corning 
Corp., 451 P.2d 177, 184 (Kan. 1969) (chemical supplier that warned inter-
mediate purchaser of toxic effects of chemical used in purchaser's manu-
facturing process had no duty to convey a direct warning to purchaser's 
employee). 
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 388 cmt. n. See also infra notes 168-69 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of the factors found in comment n. 
See O'Neal v. Celanese Corp., 10 F.3d 249, 251 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing Ken-
nedy, 84 Md. App. 397, 579 A.2d 1191); Goodbar v Whitehead Bros., 591 F. 
Supp. 552, 557 (W.D. Va. 1984) (stating that one of the factors that needs 
to be considered is the reliability of a third party as a conduit of necessary 
information about the product); Kennedy, 84 Md. App. at 405,579 A.2d at 
11 95 (citing Goodbar). 
See O'Neal, 10 F.3d at 251; Goodbar, 591 F. Supp. at 557; Kennedy, 84 Md. 
App. at 405, 579 A.2d at 1195. 
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allow courts to resolve these issues as a matter of law.53 Focusing on 
the reasonableness of manufacturer conduct in warning users of prod-
uct dangers blurs the distinction between negligence and strict liabil-
ity theories in failure-to-warn litigation.54 
3. Product-Oriented Approach 
Courts that distinguish between the section 388 negligence ap-
proach and the section 402A strict liability approach in failure-to-warn 
cases highlight the product-oriented approach of strict liability. 55 
These courts emphasize that strict liability premises its analysis on the 
condition of the product sold without adequate warnings, rather than 
on manufacturer conduct. 56 This strict liability emphasis on the prod-
uct as opposed to the reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct 
demonstrates the basic distinction between strict liability and negli-
gence.57 From a strict liability viewpoint, manufacturer conduct is 
simply irrelevant. The real inquiry is whether the product is in a de-
fective condition because it lacks adequate warnings and 
instructions. 58 
This debate between negligence and strict liability in failure-to-warn 
cases is part of the continuing need to reconcile competing, legiti-
mate concerns in products liability theory-the consumer's interest in 
product safety and the manufacturer's need for certainty, stability and 
efficiency. Courts that find no significant distinction between negli-
gent failure to warn and strict liability failure to warn tip the scales in 
favor of the manufacturer's interests. In contrast, courts that distin-
guish between negligence and strict liability arguably elevate the pub-
lic interest in product safety above marketplace innovation and 
efficiency. Clearly, the Restatement (Third) states that failure-to-warn 
cases sound in negligence.59 
53. 
54. 
55. 
56. 
57. 
58. 
59. 
See Davis v. Avondale Indus., 975 F.2d 169, 173 (5th Cir. 1992); Manning v. 
Ashland Oil Co., 721 F.2d 192, 194 (7th Cir. 1983); Hopkins v. Chip-in-Saw, 
Inc., 630 F.2d 616, 619 (8th Cir. 1980); Sara Lee Corp. v. Homasote Co., 
719 F. Supp. 417, 424 (D. Md. 1989). 
See, e.g., Davis, 975 F.2d at 172 (applying Louisiana law, specifically, LA. REv. 
STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.57 (West 1991)). 
See Werner v. Up john Co., 628 F.2d 848, 858 (4th Cir. 1980). 
[d. (stating that the distinction between negligence and strict liability disap-
pears when an unavoidably dangerous product is involved). 
See id. 
See id. 
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability ("Restatement (Third)) 
adopts a reasonableness or negligence standard in warning cases. RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) § 2(c). A product is considered defective "because of inade-
quate warnings or instruction if the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the 
product could have been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasona-
ble instructions or warnings by the seller . . . and the omission of the in-
structions or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe." [d. 
Therefore, the warning or instruction must alert product users of product 
risks and inform them of safe product use. [d. § 2(c) cmt. i. The adequacy 
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D. Manufacturer Defenses in Failure-tcrwarn Actions 
In general, the seller must warn ultimate product users of product 
risks. In some settings, however, the seller may rely on the buyer to 
provide a warning. 60 Therefore, the seller either has no duty to warn 
or the seller can discharge its warning duty by relying on the buyer to 
warn the ultimate user. Courts have struggled to define whether this 
presents a legal issue for the court as to the existence of the duty, or a 
factual question for the trier of fact as to the breach of that duty.61 
1. Sophisticated User Defense 
The sophistication and actual knowledge of anticipated product 
users may obviate the duty to warn. For example, the manufacturer of 
a connector plug is under no duty to warn electricians of the hazards 
associated with such plugs. 62 Similarly, a circuit breaker supplier has 
no duty to warn a communications company of the dangers of failing 
to test a switchboard before reactivating it after a flood.63 Addition-
ally, a gunpowder manufacturer has no duty to warn buyers that the 
risk of fire decreases if the powder is stored in a boxed container.64 
2. Bulk Supplier Defense 
The bulk supplier defense rests more on concerns of feasibility than 
knowledge.65 Normally, the bulk supplier of a chemical product or 
fluid has no practical way of physically attaching a warning to its prod-
uct in a manner that will actually reach the ultimate user. 66 As a re-
sult, such a supplier must rely on the knowledgeable intermediary 
purchaser to warn the user.67 For example, a supplier selling dielec-
tric fluids containing PCBs to an electrical transformer manufacturer 
has no duty to warn the buyer's employees of the risks associated with 
fluid handling when the fluids were delivered in bulk to a manufac-
turer /buyer aware of these product risks.68 On the other hand, when 
of product warnings is tested under a reasonableness standard which as-
sesses the advantages and disadvantages of the warning actually given and 
other reasonable alternative warnings which might have been given. Id. 
§ 2(c) cmt. a. 
60. See Goodbar v. Whitehead Bros., 591 F. Supp. 552,566 (W.D. Va. 1984). 
61. See, e.g., Byrd v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 1403 (E.D. Tenn. 1990). 
62. Bigness v. Powell Elecs., Inc., 619 N.Y.S.2d 905, 906 (App. Div. 1994). 
63. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 625 N'y.S.2d 121, 123-24 (N.Y. 
1995). 
64. Hines v. Remington Arms Co., 648 So. 2d 331, 336-37 (La. 1994). 
65. See O'Neal v. Celanese Corp., 10 F.3d 249, 254 (4th Cir. 1993). 
66. Id. (quoting Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Balbos, 326 Md. 179,219,604 A.2d 
445, 464 (1992». 
67. See, e.g., Jones v. Hittle Serv., Inc., 549 P.2d 1383,1394 (Kan. 1976). 
68. Fisher v. Monsanto Co., 863 F. Supp. 285, 287 (W.D. Va. 1994); see also 
Newson v. Monsanto Co., 869 F. Supp. 1255, 1262-63 (E.D. Mich. 1994) 
(supplier of chemical used in manufacturing windshields entitled to rely on 
automobile manufacturer, as sophisticated purchaser, to warn its employ-
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the bulk seller of fabric for protective clothing retains control over 
garment labeling, the seller cannot rely on the buyer/garment manu-
facturer to warn ultimate consumers.69 In determining the validity of 
the bulk supplier defense, courts typically focus on facts and circum-
stances establishing which party is in the superior position to warn of 
product dangers.7o 
3. Learned Intermediary Defense 
The rule that a learned or sophisticated intermediary enjoys the 
better position to communicate warnings to the ultimate user first de-
veloped in prescription drug cases.71 More recent cases have recog-
nized limitations on the doctrine. For example, in Nichols v. McNeilab, 
Inc.,72 a case involving the withdrawal of a prescription drug from the 
marketplace, the court rejected the manufacturer's learned interme-
diary defense.73 The Nichols court reasoned that, because the drug 
was prescribed for intermittent use, patients might not receive actual 
notice from their physicians in situations involving gaps in medical 
treatment.74 Many of the more recent cases arise in the workplace.75 
The trend is to require a warning only to the buyer/employer if that 
employer has the actual or constructive knowledge necessary to com-
prehend the product dangers.76 
E. Application of the Manufacturer Defenses 
Cogent application of the manufacturer defenses involves a two-pro-
nged analysis.77 The first prong considers whether the sophisticated 
purchaser/bulk supplier defense is available, thus permitting satisfac-
tion of the seller's duty to warn by warning the intermediate pur-
chaser?78 If the defense is available, the second prong considers the 
ees of risks of chemical exposure); Jodway v. Kennametal, Inc., 525 N.W.2d 
883,886 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (bulk purchaser of cobalt was "sophisticated 
user," so that supplier could avail itself of "sophisticated user" defense). 
69. Carter v. E.1. DuPont de Nemours, 456 S.E.2d 661,664 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995). 
70. See, e.g., Sara Lee v. Homasote Co., 719 F. Supp. 417 (D. Md. 1989); see also 
infra note 153 and accompanying text. 
71. See Dyer v. Danck Med., Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 732, 740 (Tex. 2000); White-
head v. Dycho Co., 775 S.W.2d 593 (Tenn. 1989). 
72. 850 F. Supp. 562 (E.D. Mich. 1993). 
73. /d. at 563. 
74. Id. at 564-65. 
75. See Scallan v. Duriron Co., 11 F.3d 1249, 1252 (5th Cir. 1994) (analyzing 
Louisiana law); O'Neal v. Celanese Corp., 10 F.3d 249, 252-54 (4th Cir. 
1993) (applying Maryland law). Cf Sharp v. Wyatt, Inc., 627 A.2d 1347, 
1360 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993) (analyzing Connecticut's Product Liability Stat-
ute which states user's sophistication is a factor to be considered by the trier 
of fact in determining warning adequacy). 
76. See, e.g., O'Neal, 10 F.3d at 252-54; Scallan, 11 F.3d at 1252. 
77. In re Asbestos Litig., 542 A.2d 1205, 1212-13 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986). 
78. Id. at 1212. 
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adequacy of the warning.79 This two-prong analysis was recently ap-
plied in Baker v. Monsanto,80 an action brought by Westinghouse em-
ployees, whose work responsibilities included repairing transformers. 
These employees claimed that the repair work exposed them to PCBs 
manufactured by Monsanto and sold to Westinghouse for use as a 
transformer lubricant.81 Monsanto defended by arguing that Westing-
house, as a sophisticated purchaser, was fully aware of PCB hazards.82 
Although the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Indiana concluded that Indiana would adopt the "knowledgeable, so-
phisticated bulk purchaser" doctrine, it held as a matter of law that 
Monsanto adequately had warned Westinghouse because Westing-
house, as a self-described expert on PCBs, had extensive, independent 
knowledge of the dangers of PCB exposure.83 
III. THE MARYLAND EXPERIENCE 
Under Maryland law, a manufacturer has two obligations in a fail-
ure-to-warn case: (1) a duty to communicate an adequate warning of 
the dangers involved in the use of the product; and (2) a duty to pro-
vide adequate instructions for product use to avoid product dangers.84 
Under general negligence theory, a manufacturer will be held lia-
ble for failing to warn or failing to warn adequately.85 In strict liabil-
ity, a product will be found defective if it is unreasonably dangerous 
without adequate warnings.86 Under either approach, the primary is-
sue is whether the manufacturer's warning is adequate under the to-
tality of the circumstances.87 Nonetheless, in Maryland, the analysis 
applied under either negligence or strict liability is actually the negli-
gence-based analysis found in section 388 of the Restatement (Second).88 
The starting point in Maryland for failure-to-warn doctrine is Moran 
v. Faberge CO.89 In Moran, the Court of Appeals of Maryland desig-
nated section 388 as the foundation for failure-to-warn analysis.90 The 
court held that a manufacturer's duty to produce a safe product, ac-
companied by appropriate warnings and instructions if necessary, is 
indistinguishable from the general responsibility of every person to 
79. Id. at 1213. 
80. 962 F. Supp. 1143 (S.D. Ind. 1997). 
81. Id. at 1146. 
82. Id. at 1147. 
83. Id. at 1159-60. 
84. Twombley v. Fuller Brush Co., 221 Md. 476, 493,158 A.2d 110, 119 (1960). 
85. See generally 1 Madden & Owen on Products Liability § 2:4 (3d ed. 2000). 
86. KEETON ET AL., supra note 48, § 96, at 685. 
87. Twombley, 221 Md. at 493, 158 A.2d at 119. 
88. See Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848,858 (4th Cir. 1980). 
89. 273 Md. 538, 332 A.2d 11 (1975). 
90. Id. at 544-45, 332 A.2d at 15-16. 
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exercise due care in order to avoid unreasonable risk of harm to 
others.91 
Both comment n to section 388 and practical considerations sup-
port Maryland case law in recognizing situations where it is either im-
practicable or unnecessary for manufacturers to warn ultimate users.92 
First, intermediate purchasers who supply the product to ultimate 
users may be as knowledgeable about the nature and extent of prod-
uct dangers as the initial supplier.93 Second, the product may be sup-
plied in bulk to the intermediate purchaser who ultimately re-
packages or re-Iabels it.94 In these situations, the manufacturer is in 
no position to warn or to instruct ultimate product users. 
A. Obvious Danger in Maryland 
1. Katz v. Arundel-Brooks Concrete Corp. 
Maryland courts have consistently held that only latent product dan-
gers, not patent product dangers, will trigger the warning require-
ments.95 In Katz v. Arundel-Brooks Concrete Corp.,96 a worker was injured 
by concrete after the manufacturer had failed to warn of product dan-
gers. The court concluded as a matter of law that "it would be as 
unreasonable to require every supplier of concrete to warn of its caus-
tic properties, as to require an electric company to warn of the danger 
of touching uninsulated wires."97 
91. Id. at 543, 332 A.2d at 15; see also Twombley, 221 Md. at 476, 158 A.2d at 110; 
Katz v. Arundel-Brooks Concrete Corp., 220 Md. 200, 151 A.2d 731 (1959). 
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 388 cmt. n. 
93. Eagle-Picher Indust. Inc. v. Balbos, 84 Md. App. 10, 61, 578 A.2d 228, 253 
(1990). 
94. Id. at 62,578 A.2d at 253 (quoting Higgins v. E.1. DuPont Nemours, 671 F. 
Supp. 1055, 1062 (D. Md. 1987». 
95. See generally Volkswagen of Am. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 219-20, 321 A.2d 
737, 74tH:7 (1974) (holding that an automobile manufacturer is liable for a 
design defect that it could have reasonably foreseen would cause or en-
hance injuries in a collision, which is neither patent nor obvious to the 
user, and which actually leads to or enhances the injuries sustained by the 
user in an automobile accident); Patten v. Logemann Bros. Co., 263 Md. 
364, 368-69, 283 A.2d 567, 569-70 (1971) (holding that since injured plain-
tiff was familiar with the dangers of a paper bailing machine, defendant-
manufacturer's failure to provide proper guards was patent rather than la-
tent, and therefore barred recovery); Blankenship v. Morrison Mach. Co., 
255 Md. 241, 24M7, 257 A.2d 430,432-33 (1969) (holding that while Mary-
land recognizes the latent-patent rule in negligence cases, a plaintiff must 
be in privity to collect on a breach of warranty claim); Banks v. Iron Hustler 
Corp., 59 Md. App. 408, 423, 475 A.2d 1243, 1250 (1984) (holding that 
patent dangers in a product bar the plaintiff from recovering on a theory of 
negligence) . 
96. 220 Md. 200, 151 A.2d 731 (1958). 
97. Id. at 204, 151 A.2d at 733; see also Twombley, 221 Md. at 493-94, 158 A.2d at 
119 (chemicals in a product could constitute a latent danger depending on 
knowledge of the product uses); Iron Hustler, 59 Md. App. 408, 475 A.2d 
1243. 
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2. Moran v. Faberge, Inc. 
In Moran v. Faberge, Inc., the court opined that the "duty to produce 
a safe product, with appropriate warnings and instructions when nec-
essary is no different from the responsibility each of us bears to exer-
cise due care to avoid unreasonable risks of harm to others."98 Moran 
measures the reasonableness of such risk by "balancing the probability 
and seriousness of harm, if care is not exercised, against the costs of 
taking appropriate precautions."99 As a general matter, Moran views 
the costs of warning as so minimal that the balancing process nearly 
always finds a duty to warn of latent dangers. 1OO 
Determining the adequacy of warnings generally involves balancing 
the following factors: (1) the dangerousness of the product; (2) the 
manner of product use; (3) the manner and form of warnings; (4) the 
burdens imposed by required warnings; and (5) the likelihood that 
the particular warning will be communicated to foreseeable product 
users.1OI The warning need only be reasonable, "not the best possible 
warning."I02 
3. Myers v. Montgomery Ward & Co. 
Myers v. Montgomery Ward & CO.103 illustrates many of the problems 
with the obvious danger rule. Myers involved injuries sustained by the 
buyer of a lawnmower not equipped with safety devices. Io4 The court 
assumed that if the consumer purchased a dangerous lawnmower with 
an obvious defect, the lack of a safety device, the consumer must have 
had adequate information with which to make a rational, reasonable 
choice. Specifically the court of appeals noted that "the absence of 
the safety devices was apparent at the time of purchase, and, in a free 
market, Myers had the choice of buying a mower equipped with them, 
of buying the mower which he did, or of buying no mower at all."lo5 
There are basic deficiencies with this analysis. First, practically 
speaking, the consumer will not necessarily have a choice between se-
lecting a safe product over a dangerous one. For example, some 
products, such as prescription drugs may be unavoidably dangerous. 
Second, although the physical absence of a safety device on a lawn-
mower may be obvious, the extent of the danger created by the lack of 
such a safety device may not be evident. Obtaining adequate safety 
information may be impossible or too expensive for the average con-
98. Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538,543, 332 A.2d 11, 15 (1975). 
99. [d. 
100. [d. at 543-44, 332 A.2d at 15. 
101. [d. at 543-46, 332 A.2d at 15-16. 
102. Levin v. Walter Kidde & Co., 251 Md. 560, 564, 248 A.2d 151, 154 (1968). 
103. 253 Md. 282,252 A.2d 855 (1969). 
104. [d. at 285-86, 252 A.2d at 857-58. 
105. [d. at 294, 297-98, 252 A.2d 862-64. 
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sumer.106 Moreover, even the consumer who perceives an abstract 
danger, may underestimate the actual hazard to him.107 Further, the 
dangerous product may harm not only the original buyer, but also 
innocent bystanders who have no voice in making purchase 
decisions. lOS 
B. Sophisticated Users and Bulk Suppliers 
Guided by comment n to Restatement (Second) section 388, federal 
courts, applying Maryland law, have recognized the sophisticated user, 
learned intermediary and bulk supplier defenses. lo9 Significantly, fed-
eral courts applying Maryland law have looked beyond the apparent 
differences in factual scenarios to recognize marketplace realities and 
to resolve product defense issues as a matter of law. 11 0 
Comment n affects both the "sophisticated user" and "bulk sup-
plier" concepts. 111 These defenses are not distinct theories, each must 
106. 
107. 
108. 
109. 
1l0. 
llI. 
See generally Malcolm Gladwell, Dow Corning to Quit Silicone Breast-Implant 
Business, WASH. POST, March 19, 1992, at AI, A12 (discussing Dow Corn-
ing's decision to discontinue the manufacture of breast implant devices in 
the wake of inadequate scientific information on their safety and expensive 
government tests which are being conducted to gather further data). 
See generally Josh Sugarman, Safety; Troubleshooting Violence; Our Traumatized 
City Can Be a Laboratory For New Solutions, WASH. POST, December 4,1994, at 
C1-C3 (advocating the need to incorporate handguns into Washington, 
D.C.'s products liability laws so that the federal government can oversee 
that firearms are safe for their intended use and do not cause injury to their 
users or innocent bystanders). 
See Timothy D. Lytton, Note, Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry: A Comparative 
Institutional Analysis, 32 CONN. L. REv. 1247, 1249-54 (2000) (advocating 
that the tort system can be reformed to better assist institutions such as 
markets, legislatures, and administrative agencies in the making of public 
policies designed to reduce handgun violence); Robert F. Cochran, Jr., 
Note, Good Whisktry, Drunk Driving and Innocent Bystanders: The Responsibility of 
Manufacturers of Alcohol and Other Dangerous Hedonic Products For Bystander 
Injury, 45 S.C. L. REv. 269, 294-335 (1994) (advocating that courts or legisla-
tures make manufacturers of alcohol and other dangerous products prima-
rily designed for entertainment and enjoyment be subject to liability for 
injuries caused to innocent bystanders). 
See, e.g., Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1985); Singleton v. 
Manitowac Co., 727 F. Supp. 217 (D. Md. 1989) (same); Sara Lee v. Homa-
sote Co., 719 F. Supp. 417 (D. Md. 1989); Higgins v. E.1. DuPont Nemours, 
671 F. Supp. 1055 (D. Md. 1987); Goodbarv. Whitehead Bros., 591 F. Supp. 
552 (W.D. Va. 1984); Housand v. Bra-Con Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 541 (D. 
Md. 1980). 
See generally Singleton, 727 F. Supp. at 218 (using the sophisticated user de-
fense in a suit involving a "blind spot" on a crane); Sara Lee, 719 F. Supp. at 
419 (involving a fire in a pickle plant allegedly caused by products devel-
oped by defendant); Higgins, 671 F. Supp. at 1056-57 (using the sophisti-
cated user defense in an action involving injuries and death arising from 
spray paint); Housand, 751 F. Supp. at 541-42 (using the sophisticated user 
defense in a suit involving a mechanical arm striking an assembly line 
worker). 
See, e.g., Adams v. Union Carbide Corp., 737 F.2d 1453 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. 
denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984). 
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be satisfied before a manufacturer may reasonably rely on a third 
party to convey warnings or instructions to ultimate product users. 
Rather, the "sophisticated user" and "bulk supplier" defenses consti-
tute separate, yet complementary aspects of the same analysis-the 
obligation of the initial seller to warn ultimate users when products 
are supplied through a third-party intermediary. The "sophisticated 
user" aspect of this inquiry focuses on intermediate purchaser knowl-
edge,Il2 while the "bulk supplier" aspect focuses on the feasibility and 
likelihood of manufacturer communications reaching the ultimate 
user who receives the product through an intermediate industrial 
purchaser. 113 
1. Goodbar v. Whitehead Bros. 
A number of federal cases that have affected the development of 
Maryland case law deserve special attention. 114 In Goodbar v. Whitehead 
Bros.,115 foundry workers sued twelve suppliers of silica sand who pro-
vided the sand in unpackaged railroad car lots to plaintiffs' employer. 
The suppliers were accused of "fail[ing] to advise the Foundry's em-
ployees with respect to the dangerous characteristics of silica products 
and how to protect themselves from them," resulting in exposure to 
silica and eventual silicosisY6 . 
Mter determining that comment n was included in Virginia law,117 
Judge Kiser reasoned that comment n "recognizes that a balancing of 
these considerations is necessary in light of the fact that no single set 
of rules could possibly be advanced that would cover all situations."IlB 
Applying this rationale, Judge Kiser weighed the factors in comment 
n, concluding that the sophisticated user defense is consistent with 
the development of failure-to-warn case lawY9 As a result, he found 
112. See, e.g., Eagle-Picher Indust., Inc. v. Balbos, 326 Md. 179, 604 A.2d 445 
(1992). 
113. See Singleton, 727 F. Supp. at 225 (citing Sara Lee, 719 F. Supp. at 424). 
114. See supra note 109-10 and accompanying text. 
115. 591 F. Supp. 552 (W.D. Va. 1984). 
116. Id. at 555. 
117. Id. at 557 (citing Barnes v. Litton Indus. Prods., Inc., 555 F.2d 1184, 1188 
(4th Cir. 1977)). 
118. Id. It is likely that the outcome of Goodbar would have been the same if the 
case had been brought under section 402A. The plaintiff-workers included 
a claim for breach of implied warranty failure to warn. Id. at 555. Judge 
Kiser stated that the duty to warn under a theory of implied warranty "fo-
cuses upon whether the lack of warning renders the product unreasonably 
dangerous .... " Id. at 556. This is identical to the standard for strict 
liability failure to warn. See Werner v. Vpjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 
1980). Judge Kiser granted summary judgment for the defendants on the 
plaintiffs' warranty claim, finding that no implied warranty arises when the 
intermediate purchaser receives the product with full knowledge of its dan-
gerous condition. Goodbar, 591 F. Supp. at 567. 
119. Id. at 560-61. 
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that the product supplier had no duty to warn employees of a knowl-
edgeable industrial purchaser of product hazards. 120 
Undisputed evidence demonstrating the foundry's extensive knowl-
edge of the hazards of silica dust inhalation, including the danger of 
developing silicosis, aided Judge Kiser in reaching this decision.121 
Significantly, the foundry was aware of proper dust control methods 
for avoiding these dangers. 122 Moreover, the court found that infor-
mation known in the industry since the 1930s should be imputed to 
foundry officials active in industry groups that disseminated technical 
information. 123 Direct evidence demonstrated that these foundry offi-
cials actually received information from industry groups, conducted 
their own occupational health studies, and had "full comprehen-
sion ... of the dangers of high silica dust concentration and silico-
SiS."124 The foundry had retained a local physician to monitor 
employees exposed to silica dust and its management had actual 
knowledge of government standards regulating permissible dust expo-
sure levels.125 The foundry's knowledge, obtained independently, 
rather than through its product suppliers, formed the basis of Judge 
Kiser's conclusion that the foundry completely appreciated the 
hazards connected with silica dust exposure, including silicosis.126 
Judge Kiser recognized substantial impediments faced by suppliers 
seeking to directly warn foundry employees of the silicosis danger: (1) 
identification of users and others exposed to the products would re-
quire constant monitoring of the suppliers due to the constant turno-
ver of the foundry's large work force; (2) sand products were 
delivered to the foundry in bulk in un packaged railroad cars or trucks 
lots; (3) written product warnings placed on the railroad cars or 
trucks could not reach affected workers or bystanders because loose 
sand was unloaded and stored in storage bins until used; (4) only the 
foundry was in a position to provide the necessary housekeeping mea-
sures, training and warnings to its workers on a continuous and sys-
120. [d. at 559. (citing Marshall v. H.K. Ferguson Co., 623 F.2d 882 (4th Cir. 
1980»; see also Spangler v. Kranco, Inc., 481 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1973); 
Markerv. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 250 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1957); Littlehale 
v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 268 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), affd, 
380 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1967). 
121. Goodbar, 591 F. Supp. at 561-65. 
122. [d. 
123. [d. at 556. 
124. [d. at 563. 
125. [d. at 56465. 
126. [d. The plaintiffs' experts in Goodbarcriticized the foundry's lack of proper 
corrective measures and concluded that, because of this inaction, the foun-
dry did not have the requisite sophistication. [d. at 565. Judge Kiser found 
"this conclusion to be nothing short of amazing." [d. The plaintiffs' ex-
perts admitted that the foundry had information available about silica dust 
exposure and silicosis. [d. Judge Kiser concluded that "since the Foundry 
had such insight, Defendants could assume that proper use would be made 
thereof." [d. 
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tematic basis; (5) the suppliers were forced to rely on the foundry to 
convey safety information to its employees; (6) confusion would result 
from twelve different suppliers each providing competing, inconsis-
tent information to foundry workers; and (7) given the commercial 
setting, suppliers realistically could not exert pressure on a large, in-
dustrial customer to permit the suppliers access to the foundry to edu-
cate foundry workers about the hazards of silicosis. 127 
Against this factual background, Judge Kiser concluded that no dis-
puted material question of fact existed as to whether the suppliers 
reasonably relied on the foundry to convey appropriate safety infor-
mation to its workers. 128 As a result, he granted the suppliers' mo-
tions for summary judgment, holding on two grounds that they had 
no duty to warn foundry employees: (1) the employer was a knowl-
edgeable industrial purchaser; and (2) only the employer was directly 
able to communicate effective warnings to the ultimate product 
users.129 
2. Higgins v. E.!. Du Pont de Nemours & Co . 
The Goodbar reasoning furnished the cornerstone of the decision in 
Higgins v. E.!. DuPont de Nemours & CO. 130 In Higgins, the Baltimore 
City Fire Department purchased Imron paint from DuPont, which 
manufactured the paint using glycol ether acetates supplied by East-
man and Union Carbide.131 Eventually, Baltimore City firefighters 
brought a products liability action against DuPont, Kodak and Union 
Carbide sounding in negligence, strict liability, and warranty, for fail-
ure to warn of possible teratogenic effects of Imron paint.132 
Judge Smalkin granted summary judgment in favor of Kodak and 
Union Carbide, the bulk suppliers of chemicals to Du Pont, holding as 
a matter of law that they had no duty to warn ultimate users, the 
firefighters actually exposed to the chemicals in the paint.133 The un-
disputed facts revealed a "plethora of material" evidencing Du Pont's 
extensive knowledge concerning possible teratogenic effects of glycol 
ether acetates.134 The suppliers had obtained independent research 
and information gathered from third parties, including its own suppli-
ers.135 DuPont's knowledge included technical studies conducted by 
DuPont's own employees. These studies noted that high doses of the 
127. 
128. 
129. 
130. 
131. 
132. 
133. 
134. 
135. 
Id. at 566 (citing Reed v. Pennwalt Corp., 591 P.2d 478 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1979»; Victor Schwartz & Robert Driver, Warnings in the Workplace: The Need 
For Synthesis of Law and Communication Theory, 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 38 (1983). 
Goodbar, 591 F. Supp. at 567. 
Id. at 566-67. 
671 F. Supp. 1055 (D. Md. 1987); see generally id. at 1058-59. 
Id. at lO56. 
Id. 
Id. at 1062-63. 
Id. at 1056. 
Id. at 1061. 
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involved chemicals produced toxic effects on the reproductive and he-
matological systems of mice. 136 Moreover, DuPont received reports 
prepared by Japanese researchers, by Dow Chemical and by the Na-
tional Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) discuss-
ing possible teratogenic effects.137 Finally, Union Carbide and Kodak 
had advised DuPont of research findings that animals experienced tes-
ticular changes and infertility from high chemical exposure. 
The court held that DuPont was in a superior position than either 
of the bulk suppliers to communicate effective warnings to ultimate 
users because it manufactured, packaged, labeled and distributed the 
finished product.138 Thus, DuPont easily could have communicated 
an effective warning to its customers. By comparison, Kodak and 
Union Carbide were unable, as a practical matter, to communicate 
any warning to the ultimate users because they supplied the chemicals 
to DuPont in bulk. 139 
In opposing summary judgment, the plaintiffs argued that the so-
phisticated user and bulk supplier defenses were unavailable in strict 
liability claims under section 402A.140 Moreover, they insisted that the 
adequacy of warnings is a factual question for the trier of fact, pre-
cluding summary judgment on the negligence claims. In the absence 
of controlling Maryland decisions,Judge Smalkin followed Goodbar. 141 
As previously discussed, Maryland courts developed a two-part analy-
sis for the sophisticated user/bulk supplier defense. 142 The first 
prong focuses on the status of the purchaser, DuPont, a chemical 
company having sophisticated knowledge of chemicals. 143 As a dealer 
in chemicals, DuPont presumably knew the risks and had no need for 
product danger warnings. 144 The second prong involves the defend-
ants' position as bulk suppliers of chemicals. 145 This prong addresses 
the feasibility of providing warnings beyond DuPont, to end-users, be-
cause the product is not actually packaged until a later point in the 
distribution process.146 Generally, warnings are usually found to be 
most effectively conveyed when placed directly on the product, its la-
bel or container.147 
136. Id. 
137. /d. 
138. Id. at 1061-62. 
139. Id. at 1062. 
140. Id. at 1057. 
141. Id. at lO62. 
142. See supra notes lO9-11 and accompanying text. 
143. See Higgins, 671 F. Supp. at lO62. 
144. /d. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. 
147. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 156.lO(4) (i) (1999) (requiring warning label to be se-
curely attached to the pesticide products immediate container); Andries v. 
Gen. Motors Corp., 444 So. 2d 1180, 1183 (La. 1983) (upholding finding 
that battery was adequately labeled where warning label was placed on 
2001] Failure to Warn Defenses in Maryland Law 361 
3. Sara Lee v. Homasote 
Following Goodbar and Higgins, Judge Black ruled in Sara Lee v. 
Homasote 48 that the suppliers of bulk chemicals to an intermediate 
manufacturer had no duty to convey direct warnings to users of the 
manufacturer's finished product. In Sara Lee, the owner of a pickle 
processing plant sued ARea and BASF, suppliers of a chemical raw 
material known generically as expandable polystyrene beads ("EPS 
beads") to an intermediate industrial purchaser.149 The purchaser 
fabricated the EPS beads into expanded polystyrene board insulation, 
some of which was sold to a contractor who used it in construction of 
the plant. 150 After a fire destroyed the plant, the owner alleged that 
ARea and BASF were liable in negligence, warranty and strict liability 
for failure to warn of the product's flammability.151 
Judge Black described Goodbar and Higgins as "persuasive and con-
trolling" of the failure-to-warn claims against ARea and BASF.152 He 
applied the factors in comment n of section 388, balancing the magni-
tude of the risks, the intermediary'S knowledge of the risks and the 
ability of the bead suppliers to communicate with ultimate users. 153 
Judge Black recognized that, although the potential product risks 
were substantial, the suppliers' intermediate purchaser "was a knowl-
edgeable industrial user of EPS beads," fully aware of its 
flammability. 154 
The evidence in Sara Lee demonstrated that the president and 
owner of the intermediate purchaser was a pioneer in the EPS bead 
industry, who had acquired extensive independent knowledge of the 
product's flammability.155 Moreover, the suppliers had furnished to 
their immediate customers "product literature concerning the flam-
mability characteristics of EPS raw material and EPS board insulation, 
as well as other important information on product uses and 
applications."156 
The court concluded that the intermediate purchaser was in the 
superior position to communicate an effective warning to ultimate 
users.157 Significantly, the beads were received by the intermediate 
purchaser in bulk shipments of one thousand-pound containers that 
148. 
149. 
150. 
151. 
152. 
153. 
154. 
155. 
156. 
157. 
product); Gillespie v. Century Products Co., 936 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Tex. App. 
1996) (asserting that label placed directly on product was a sufficient 
means to convey the warning). 
719 F. Supp. 417 (D. Md. 1989). 
Id. at 419. 
Id. 
Id. 
Id. at 420. 
Id. at 421-22. 
Id. at 424. 
Id. at 422-23. 
Id. at 423. 
Id. at 424. 
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were later reprocessed and repackaged for distributing. I58 Conse-
quently, ARCa and BASF could not have feasibly placed a warning on 
the EPS beads that would have reached the ultimate users.I59 As a 
result, the court analogized the difficulties encountered by the bulk 
suppliers in warning the foundry employees in Goodbar to the 
problems faced by ARCa and BASF.I60 The court also recognized 
that "it would be difficult and unduly burdensome" for the suppliers 
to identity, much less provide training to, all customers of products 
containing the suppliers' EPS beads. I61 
The plaintiff in Sara Lee argued that unlike the bulk suppliers in 
Goodbar, ARCa and BASF actually had developed and directly mar-
keted the technology for molding the EPS raw material to consum-
ers.I62 The plaintiff contended that, "by virtue of this involvement," 
ARca and BASF incurred an obligation to directly warn consum-
ers. I63 The court found this argument unpersuasive, however, stating 
that: 
[t] he focus of the bulk supplier/sophisticated user defense is 
not on the knowledge of the raw material suppliers, but 
rather on the knowledge of the industrial purchaser. The 
record in this case establishes that Foam Industries knew or 
should have known at least as much about the dangers of 
EPS board insulation to the end user as ARCa and BASF. I64 
Theoretically, strict liability should evaluate the product in its final 
condition rather than the reasonableness of the manufacturer's con-
duct in producing it. Nevertheless, the standard applied in strict lia-
bility warning cases, which evaluates the reasonableness of 
manufacturer conduct, more closely resembles a negligence standard 
by evaluating the reasonableness of manufacturer conduct. I65 Under 
strict liability theory, inadequate warnings render a product defective 
and unreasonably dangerous. I66 Under a negligence standard, how-
ever, if a seller's conduct is reasonable in framing the product's warn-
ings, those warnings are considered "adequate."167 
In the context of industrial products, any consideration of whether 
a product safety warning is "adequate" must take into account both 
distribution and workplace realities. From this perspective, the most 
effective and, therefore, the most adequate warning that a manufac-
158. Id. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. 
165. See Kenneth M. Willner, Failures to Warn and the Sophisticated User Defense, 74 
VA. L. REv. 579, 582-83 (1988). 
166. Id. at 58l. 
167. Id. at 582 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A cmt.j). 
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turer can provide, will often be to the employer who will, in turn, in-
corporate the information into its training procedures. 
IV. ADOPTION OF THE SOPHISTICATED USER DEFENSE IN 
THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
The drafters of the Restatement (Second) recognized that under cer-
tain circumstances it would be impracticable for product suppliers to 
effectively communicate warnings directly to users. In Restatement (Sec-
ond) section 388 comment n, the drafters assert that a supplier of a 
product may discharge its duty to provide an adequate warning by 
providing information to a third person through whom the product is 
supplied to the ultimate user.168 Comment n identifies the following 
factors to determine whether a product supplier has relied reasonably 
on an intermediary to convey warnings to ultimate product users: 
(1) the dangerous condition of the product; 
(2) the purpose for which the product is used; 
(3) the form of any warnings given; 
(4) the reliability of the third person as a conduit of neces-
sary information about the product; 
(5) the magnitude of the risk involved; and 
(6) the burden imposed on the supplier by requiring that 
he directly warn all users.169 
A. Workplace Warnings Liability 
The considerations in comment n are particularly relevant when an 
industrial customer purchases the initial manufacturer's product for 
use in its own manufacturing process. 170 The increased impact of 
warnings liability for injuries arising in the industrial setting has 
caused two commentators to conclude that the "expansion of warn-
ings liability has occurred with little consideration of what is known 
about the communication and dissemination of information."171 
Consequently, the extension of workplace warnings liability unguided 
by practical considerations may result in two undesirable effects. 1 72 
First, holding a manufacturer liable for failing to provide warnings to 
employees of an intermediate purchaser has the unreasonable poten-
168. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 388 cmt. n. 
169. [d. 
170. In an industrial setting, a written warning is generally not an effective 
means of communicating safety information. Because of varying hazards 
that may arise in different manufacturing processes, reduction of work-
place injuries can only be accomplished through repeated safety instruc-
tion that is adapted to the particular workplace and process geared toward 
the individual employees. This must be accompanied by enforcement of 
appropriate safety rules. See Schwartz & Driver, supra note 127, at 40-43. 
171. Schwartz & Driver, supra note 127, at 40. 
172. [d. at 43. 
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tial of imposing absolute liability in those situations where it is imprac-
ticable for the manufacturer to warn the product user directly.I73 
Second, the imposition of such liability upon manufacturers may lead 
to an overuse of "legally sufficient, but practicably useless and even 
counterproductive warnings" that will ultimately increase the occur-
rence of injuries in the workplace. I74 
The principles of "communication theory"175 are applicable to the 
particular problems that attend the transmission of warnings in indus-
trial settings where manufacturers and end-users are separated by one 
or more intermediate purchasers. I76 Applying the communication 
theory, some commentators have outlined three broad requisites for 
effective warnings. I77 Warnings must reach the intended audience, 
must contain adequate admonitory and instructional information, 
and must be understood by the intended audience. I78 Because" [t] he 
ultimate objective of any product warning should be to reduce the risk 
of injury associated with the product," the critical question must be 
who can most effectively disseminate product safety information in a 
manner that will actually protect the product users. I79 Considered 
from this perspective, a manufacturer is frequently not the best pro-
vider of effective safety information to the employee using the prod-
uct in an industrial setting.I80 
1. Manufacturer Inability to Identify Particular Hazards 
For a product warning to be effective, it is essential that the pro-
vider "be able to identify the specific hazards which the product user 
is likely to encounter."I8I Manufacturers of raw materials, bulk chemi-
cals or industrial equipment are frequently unable to predict the risks 
associated with the use of their products in another manufacturer's 
process. I82 
173. Id. (citing Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1979), Bellotte v. Zayre Corp., 352 A.2d 723 (N.H. 1976) and Schuh v. Fox 
River Tractor Co., 218 N.W.2d 279 (Wis. 1974)). The Maryland Court of 
Appeals has previously stated that the adoption of strict liability was not 
intended to cast a seller of a product in the role of insurer or to impose 
absolute liability on sellers for any injury arising from the use of a product. 
Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 352, 363 A.2d 955, 963 (1976). 
174. Schwartz & Driver, supra note 127, at 43-44. 
175. Id. at 45. Communication theory is concerned with the description and 
analysis of communication primarily through the use of models intended to 
define the functional components of a "communication." Id. 
176. Id. at 67. 
177. See id. at 46. 
178. See generally id. at 46-66 (noting that "[p]roduct warnings are a specialized 
form of communication"). 
179. Id. at 51-52, 62. 
180. Id. at 62. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. 
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Courts have held that where a manufacturer is unable to predict 
specific hazards that the ultimate product user may encounter, it 
should not be held liable for failure to warn.183 For example, in Gon-
zalez v. Volvo of America,184 plaintiffs sustained injuries when their 
Volvo station wagon overturned while pulling a V-Haul trailer. Plain-
tiffs argued that Volvo should have warned them of the risks of a mis-
match of the trailer hitch and bumper. Because Volvo could not have 
identified the specific risk of a mismatched trailer hitch, the court 
ruled in favor of Volvo as a matter of law.185 The court reasoned: 
We acknowledge that Section 402A imposed upon Volvo a 
duty to provide plaintiffs with a reasonably safe station 
wagon. In our opinion, however, this duty did not extend to 
a requirement to warn them that a particular trailer hitch 
was unsafe to use, particularly when it was installed as appro-
priate by a company engaged in the business of renting trail-
ers. The intervention of a professional such as V-Haul is the 
rule and not the exception when consumers rent trailer 
hitches. It was the duty of such professionals and not the 
duty of defendant-appellant to select an appropriate hitch 
for plaintiffs. Stated otherwise, the station wagon which de-
fendant Volvo furnished to plaintiffs was not dangerous be-
yond the expectations of ordinary consumers. Ordinary 
consumers consult trailer lessors such as V-Haul when rent-
ing trailer hitches, a necessary addition if the trailer is to be 
utilized. It is the advice of such third parties and not the 
warnings of automobile manufacturers upon which ordinary 
consumers do, and should be entitled to rely.186 
2. Warnings from a Credible Source 
Apart from identifying particular hazards, "the effectiveness of a 
product warning depends in large part on the credibility of its 
183. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Volvo of Am., 752 F.2d 295 (7th Cir. 1985). 
184. 752 F.2d 295. 
185. Id. at 301. 
186. Id. at 300. As a general rule of products liability, under both negligence 
and strict liability, a product manufacturer must warn product users or con-
sumers of its product's dangers. Christopher P. Downs, Comment, Duty to 
Warn and the Sophisticated User Defense in Products Liability Cases, 15 U. BALT. 
L. REv. 276, 280 (1986). Often the product manufacturer can fulfill its duty 
to warn by placing a warning on the product or by providing information in 
the owner's manual or brochures delivered with the product. Nevertheless, 
in some circumstances it is impossible or highly impracticable directly to 
warn the ultimate product user. In these situations, product providers sat-
isfy their warning duty through intermediaries who warn or instruct the 
ultimate product user. See generally, Richard C. Ausness, Learned In-
tennediaries and Sophisticated Users: Encouraging the Use of Intennediaries to 
Transmit Product Safety Information, 46 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1185 (1996). 
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source."187 An employer will generally have a close relationship and, 
thus, more credibility with its employees than a remote manufac-
turer. 188 Furthermore, the warnings should be adapted to the individ-
ual needs of the intended receivers, including the employees in a 
workplace setting.189 Adapting the warning to individual needs would 
be easier for the employer than for the manufacturer, as the employer 
has a much better perspective to evaluate its employees' intelligence 
and education, as well as their familiarity with the product and techni-
cal terms.190 
Because of its familiarity with the extent of its workers' education 
and work experience, only the employer can provide and enforce the 
appropriate levels of training required in the workplace.191 Written 
warnings from a remote manufacturer cannot provide the necessary 
supervision and feedback required in an effective safety program. 192 
Indeed, a remote product manufacturer is not even in a position to 
determine whether its purchasers' employees are capable of compre-
hending complex technical warnings, or to respond to individual em-
ployee inquiries concerning specific technical information.193 The 
employer, "with the discipline inherent in the employment relation-
ship," is in the unique position to implement and enforce appropriate 
and effective training programs. 194 The employer's consistent work-
place presence allows it to control that environment and compel ad-
herence to safety rules adapted to the idiosyncratic use of the product 
in its manufacturing process.195 
B. Inappropriate Imposition of Absolute Liability 
Written warnings provided by manufacturers and directed to users 
of industrial products, unaccompanied by employee training pro-
grams, generally will not be effective in reducing product-related acci-
dents in the workplace. 196 Holding manufacturers liable for injuries 
they could not reasonably be expected to prevent is tantamount to the 
187. Schwartz & Driver, supra note 127, at 63. 
188. /d. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. at 63-64. The commentators point out that "[t]wenty-five million people 
in the United States cannot read at all. Another thirty-five million are func-
tionally illiterate; millions of others read only in a language other than En-
glish." Id. at 64. Only the employer is in a position to assess the possibility 
that illiteracy and other reading problems will render written warnings 
meaningless to its employees. Id. 
191. Id. at 71-72. 
192. Id. at 42-43. 
193. Id. at 71. 
194. Id. at 71-72. 
195. Id. at 72. 
196. /d. at 74. The obviousness of this principle has been recognized by the 
regulatory scheme set forth in OSHA's Hazard Communication Standard. 
29 C.F.R. §1910.1200. 
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imposition of absolute liability.197 Such an approach flies in the face 
of consistent pronouncements by courts that "strict liability is not a 
radical departure from traditional tort concepts. Despite the use of 
the term 'strict liability,' the seller is not an insurer, as absolute liabil-
ity is not imposed on the seller for any injury resulting from the use of 
his product."198 
The imposition of absolute liability on product manufacturers for 
failure to warn would have undesirable economic consequences. 199 
The costs associated with absolute liability would be incorporated into 
the costs of raw materials, component parts and, ultimately, finished 
products.20o Thus, society at every level would incur the cost "of work-
place injuries which would be preventable under a properly focused 
set of rules of warnings liability."201 
Various commentators maintain that "the most effective solution to 
workplace warnings problems is to require the employer to communi-
cate safety information to its employees through training and supervi-
sion."202 This is particularly true given employers' statutory and 
common-law duties to maintain a safe workplace, including mainte-
nance of safe equipment, warning of any dangers in the workplace, 
and training and supervision of their employees.203 The employer 
generally receives product safety information from the product manu-
facturer or acquires it through other sources.204 The employer is in 
the best position to know the dangers associated with the industrial 
products it purchases and uses in its manufacturing process.205 
Therefore, the product manufacturer's duty to warn the employer 
should be limited to those dangers the employer could not or should 
not discover. 206 
197. 
198. 
199. 
200. 
201. 
202. 
203. 
204. 
205. 
206. 
Schwartz & Driver, supra note 127, at 74. 
Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 351-52, 363 A.2d 955, 963 
(1976); see also Miles Labs., Inc. v. Doe, 315 Md. 704, 717,556 A.2d 1107, 
1113 (1989); accord Singleton v. Manitowoc, 727 F. Supp. 217, 221 (D. Md. 
1989). 
See Schwartz & Driver, supra note 127, at 74. Manufacturers who are held 
absolutely liable have no incentive to warn unless the warning would re-
duce the number of accidents. Because warnings directed at users of indus-
trial products generally are not effective in reducing accidents, 
manufacturers are forced to pass the costs of workplace injuries on to soci-
ety. Id. 
Id. 
Id. 
Id. at 79. 
Id. at 79 n.183. 
See, e.g., Higgins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours, 671 F. Supp. 1055, 1167 (D. 
Md. 1987) (noting that had employer not redistributed manufacturer's 
product in unlabeled cans to its employers, they would not have been 
injured). 
Schwartz & Driver, supra note 127, at 79. This is important because indus-
trial products have a variety of potential hazards associated with their par-
ticular use. Id. at 58. 
Id. at 79. 
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Such rules promote effective communication to insure that the 
product user understands and appreciates the necessary safety infor-
mation.207 Thus, they are most likely "to accomplish the basic legal 
objective underlying warnings liability-accident prevention."208 
V. THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
On May 20, 1997, the American Law Institute membership adopted 
the "Proposed Final Draft," which is the latest and probably final ver-
sion of the Restatement (Third), "subject to the usual editorial preroga-
tives.''209 The last half of the twentieth century will be remembered as 
a technological revolution.210 Products liability law seeks to compen-
sate injured individuals through allocation of losses.211 As Justice 
Traynor explained in his concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola 
Bottling Co., "public policy demands that responsibility be fixed 
wherein it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health 
inherent in defective products that reach the market."212 Clearly, 
technology is a "challenge to our outdated legal framework."213 
The stated purpose of the Restatement (Third) was to reflect the cur-
rent state of products liability law.214 As the reporters Professors Hen-
derson and Twerski stated as they embarked on their project: 
[DJoctrinal developments in products liability have placed 
such a heavy gloss on the original text of and comments to 
section 402A as to render them anachronistic and at odds 
with their currently discerned objectives. By changing the 
relevant language to conform to current understandings-by 
restating the Restatement-we hope to clarify much of the 
confusion that has arisen over the years.215 
The Proposed Final Draft contained 386 pages of black letter law, 
comments and reporters' notes.216 It consists of twenty-one sec-
207. Id. at 83. 
208. Id.; see also GENERAL LIABILITY AND CONSUMER LAw COMMITfEE, FAILURE TO 
WARN: PRODUCT WARNINGS, INSTRUCTIONS & USER INFORMATION, ABA TIPS 
PRODUCTS (1996). 
209. RESTATEMENT (THIRD). 
210. See, e.g., David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Products Liability Law: To-
ward First Principles, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 427, 429 (1993) ("[C]ivilization 
is marching into the twenty-first century in a blaze of advancing 
technology.") . 
211. KEETON ET AL., supra note 48, § 1, at 5-6. 
212. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Ca. 1944). 
213. Id. at 440. 
214. Michael R. Maule, Comment, Applying Strict Products Liability to Computer 
Software, 27 Tulsa LJ. 735, 756 (1992). 
215. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1512, 1513 
(1992); see also James A. Henderson,Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, The Politics of 
the Products Liability Restatement, 26 HOFSTRA L. REv. 667 (1998). 
216. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8. 
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tions.217 Sections 1 through 8 address liability for defects existing at 
the time of sale.218 Sections 9 through 11 concern post-sale obliga-
tions.219 Sections 12 through 14 deal with successor and apparent 
manufacturer liability.220 Finally, sections 15 through 21 address "pro-
visions of general applicability," including causation, affirmative de-
fenses, and definitions.221 
A. Retention of the Product Defect Categories 
Significantly, section 2 of the Restatement (Third) retains the catego-
ries of product defect that exist in current products liability jurispru-
dence: defective manufacture, defective design and defective warning 
instruction.222 Subsection (a) defines manufacturing defect as a "de-
part[ure] from its intended design."223 Subsection (b) defines defec-
tive design, stating that" [a] product ... is defective in design when 
the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been 
reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative de-
sign ... and the omission of the alternative design renders the prod-
uct not reasonably safe."224 The reasonable alternative design 
requirement has proved to be extremely controversia1.225 Subsection 
(c) applies the same concept to warning and instructions defects.226 A 
product is defective when it omits risk avoidance or reduction infor-
mation, the omission of which renders the product "not reasonably 
safe."227 
1. Negligence-Based Design and Warning Defect 
Comment a to section 2 establishes that the only liability standard 
for manufacturing defects is "strict liability."228 The design and warn-
ing defect standards are negligence-based.229 Significantly, the "con-
sumer-expectation" test is eliminated as an independent standard for 
217. See id. 
218. Id. §§ 1-8. Sections 1 through 4 cover products generally, and sections 5 
through 8 cover special products and product markets, including prescrip-
tion drugs and medical devices. Id. 
219. Id. §§ 9-11. These sections cover time of sale misrepresentations, post-sale 
failure to warn and post-sale failure to recall product, respectively. Id. 
220. Id. §§ 12-14. 
221. Id. §§ 15-21. In particular sections 19 through 21 define "product," "one 
who sells or otherwise distributes," and "harm to persons or property." Id. 
222. Id. § 2. 
223. Id. 
224. Id. 
225. See id. at Introduction; see also id. § 2 cmt. b (explaining that some courts 
require the plaintiff to prove there is an alternative design available while 
other courts use the consumer expectations test which directly contradicts 
the alternative design requirement). 
226. Id. § 2. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. § 2 cmt. a. 
229. Id. 
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determining defectiveness.23o Instead, consumer expectation is rele-
gated to the status of a mere non-dispositive factor for consideration 
in risk-utility balancing.231 As a logical consequence of this "demo-
tion" of the consumer-expectation test, the obvious danger defense is 
eliminated in defective design cases.232 
Under the Restatement (Third) negligence-based standard, warnings 
and instructions must be reasonable.233 Reasonableness is measured 
by considering content, comprehensibility, manner of expression, and 
characteristics of expected user groups.234 Instruction for the safe use 
of the product must be clear and complete.235 Further, if there are 
unavoidable, material risks associated with the use of the product, 
such risks must be disclosed adequately and completely so that the 
user can make an informed choice whether to use the product.236 
B. Retention of the Obvious Danger Rule 
The Restatement (Third) retains the obvious danger rule in warning 
defect cases, thus relieving the manufacturer of the duty to warn or 
instruct of risks that are generally known to product users.237 On the 
other hand, a product manufacturer or seller must provide warnings 
for non-obvious risks that would be material to product users in decid-
ing whether to use the product. 238 Such product warnings should be 
provided to anyone "who a reasonable seller should know will be in a 
position to reduce or avoid the risk of harm."239 
C. The Restatement (Third) on Learned Intermediaries 
The Restatement (Third) insulates health product manufacturers 
from liability if physicians do not provide product warnings to their 
patients.24o Under the Restatement (Third), section 8(d) (1), liability is 
imposed on the manufacturer only if "reasonable instructions or 
warnings regarding foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug or 
medical device are not provided to prescribing and other health-care 
providers who are in a position to reduce the risks of harm in accor-
dance with the instructions or warnings."241 In mass vaccination cases, 
however, comment e recognizes that health-care providers cannot 
230. Id. § 2 ernt. g. 
231. Id. 
232. Id. 
233. Id. § 2 ernt. i. 
234. Id. 
235. Id. 
236. Id. 
237. Id. § 2 ernt. j. 
238. Id. § 2 ernt. i. 
239. Id. § 2 ernt. h. 
240. [d. § 8(d)(1). 
241. [d. 
\ 
. 
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warn patients, imposing a duty on the manufacturer to provide a di-
rect warning to the patient.242 
The Restatement (Third) recognizes two other special situations. 
First, direct patient warnings sometimes are required by statute or reg-
ulation.243 Birth control pills and devices are examples.244 Second, 
drug manufacturers sometimes advertise directly to the public.245 The 
Restatement (Third) does not view these situations as exceptions to its 
no warning rule. Instead, it provides that even if there is a duty to 
warn patients directly, there remains the question of whether courts 
should review the adequacy of these warnings.246 The Restatement 
(Third) leaves this issue to developing case law.247 
The question of whether the manufacturer may discharge the warn-
ings obligation by warning a learned or sophisticated intermediary de-
pends on what is reasonable under the factual circumstances.248 
Significantly, under section 2, comment i, the lack of warning of una-
voidable risk is not a legal cause of injury if the product user would 
have chosen to use the product anyway.249 Under comment j, no 
warnings are required of generally known or obvious risks.250 By con-
trast, the manufacturer must warn for foreseeable adverse allergic or 
idiosyncratic reactions if a substantial number of users are susceptible 
to the allergic reaction.251 
The impact of the Restatement (Third) on Maryland warnings cases 
cannot be predicted with certainty. To some extent, the "revolution-
ary" work is still to come. The debates that occupied the American 
Law Institute will be replayed in the states, including Maryland. More-
over, should Congress depart from its history and pass a uniform na-
tional products liability law, the Restatement (Third) will to some extent 
become moot. 
Plainly, the Restatement (Third) will not have as dramatic or "revolu-
tionary" an influence as the Restatement (Second).252 Section 402A of 
the Restatement (Second) was not so much a statement of settled princi-
ples as it was a suggested new jurisprudence for states that did not 
possess their own significant body of products liability 
jurisprudence.253 
242. Id. § 8 cmt. e. 
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248. Id. § 8 cmt. b. 
249. See id. § 2 cmt. i. 
250. Id. § 2 cmt. j. 
251. Id. § 2 cmt. k. 
252. Id. at xv (stating the Restatement (Second) provided a comprehensive engage-
ment of the law of torts). 
253. Id. (stating that, by 1990, the Restatement (Second) had been cited nearly 3000 
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Today, many states have addressed the issues considered in the Re-
statement (Third).254 As a result, the degree of acceptance of the new 
Restatement may be tempered by principles of stare decisis, or even legis-
lative and judicial inertia.255 Given Maryland's conservative attitude 
towards products liability innovation,256 the courts and legislature may 
not be receptive to rethinking basic, deeply embedded state law prin-
ciples. As a result, defenses are likely to remain unchanged. 
D. Impact on the Bulk Supplier, Sophisticated User, and Learned Intermedi-
ary Doctrines 
Two sections of the Restatement (Third) affect the bulk supplier, so-
phisticated user and learned intermediary doctrines: Sections 5 and 6. 
Section 5 deals with liability of component-part sellers, while section 6 
deals with liability for prescription drugs and medical devices. 
1. Section 5 
Section 5 provides that the seller of a component part that is not 
defective itself is not liable for harm caused by a product into which 
the component was integrated unless the component seller substan-
tially participates in integrating that component into the design of the 
product.257 Section 5 seems both fair and efficient. In most situa-
tions, the component-part seller cannot monitor how its component is 
utilized by the end-product manufacturer. If liability were imposed 
on the component-part manufacturer, it would have to achieve "suffi-
cient sophistication to review the decisions of the business entities that 
are already charged with the responsibility for the integrated 
product."258 
Section 5 was applied first in Zaza v. Marquess & Nell, Inc.,259 a case 
in which the defendant, a sheet metal fabricator manufactured a 
quench tank according to specifications.26o These specifications did 
254. 
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257. 
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Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930 (Kan. 2000); Cavanaugh v. Skil Corp., 
751 A.2d 518 (NJ. 2000); Lewis v. Samson, 992 P.2d 282 (N.M. Ct. App. 
1999); Buonanno v. Colmar Belting Co., 733 A.2d 712 (R.I. 1999). 
See United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that 
under the principal of legislative inertia, courts will leave laws undis-
turbed); Meredith v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 18 F.3d 890, 895 (10th Cir. 
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not require the fabricator to install safety devices.261 The fabricator 
was merely required to cut holes for such safety devices.262 When the 
tank was integrated into a regeneration system, the safety devices were 
not installed.263 
The plaintiff argued that the fabricator had a non-delegable duty to 
make certain that the quench tank was integrated into the regenera-
tion system with the safety devices.264 He further argued that the de-
fendant must warn of the dangers of operating the quench tank 
without safety devices.265 Concluding that the quench tank was non-
defective, the Zaza court reasoned that it was not feasible for the com-
ponent-part manufacturer to attach safety devices to a quench tank.266 
The court also opined that it was not possible for such a sheet metal 
fabricator to warn the product's end-user about the dangers of using 
the product without such safety devices.267 
More recent decisions have applied section 5 as well. Component 
manufacturers of teflon used in medical implants,268 silicone used in 
breast implants,269 asbestos used in insulation,27o and a pulley inte-
grated into a conveyor belt271 have all been absolved of liability. 
2. Section 6 
Section 6 addresses manufacturer liability for defective prescription 
drugs and medical devices.272 Section 6(b) (2) imposes liability for de-
fective drug design if the foreseeable risks of harm by the drug are 
sufficiently greater than foreseeable therapeutic benefits.273 As a re-
sult, if a class of patients exists for whom the drug is the reasonable 
therapeutic choice, it cannot be defectively designed. At the same 
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(1998). 
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1998) (citing to section 5 but holding that raw asbestos is itself a defective 
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time, if a different FDA-approved drug is on the market that provides 
comparable benefits with reduced harm or risk, presumably no rea-
sonable health-care provider would prescribe the riskier drug.274 
Another aspect of Section 6 impacts the effect of the learned inter-
mediary doctrine when drug manufacturers directly advertise their 
drugs to the general public. Under the traditional learned intermedi-
ary rule, a drug manufacturer fulfills its duty to warn by warning the 
physician, rather than the patient.275 Nevertheless, sometimes pa-
tients should be directly warned. For example, if vaccines are admin-
istered without physician participation, courts have recognized an 
obligation to warn patients themselves. 276 
Difficult questions arise when drugs are directly advertised and mar-
keted to consumers. Comment e of section 6 of the Restatement (Third) 
recognizes that in such situations the learned intermediary rule prob-
ably should not insulate drug manufacturers from liability if the adver-
tisements do not adequately inform patients of the risks posed by the 
drug. The Restatement (Third), however, leaves to developing case law 
whether to recognize an exception to the learned intermediary rule 
for mass marketing of drugs. In Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc.,277 the 
New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that the learned intermediary 
doctrine should not relieve drug manufacturers of liability for com-
mercially advertised products if consumers are not warned adequately 
of drug risks. 
E. Impact oj the Restatement (Third) 
The Restatement (Third) is most likely to affect cases of first impres-
sion. For example, if the adoption of comparative negligence is re-
considered, the Restatement (Third) view could be influentia1.278 On 
the other hand, if a state has entrenched case law or legislation, it may 
ignore the Restatement (Third) views.279 Significant controversy is likely 
274. But see George W. Conk, Is there a Design Defect in the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts: Products Liability?, 109 YALE LJ. 1087, 1102 (2000). The Reporters 
of the Restatement (Third) "believe that Conk has misread Section 6(c) since, 
if there was available on the market an FDA-approved drug that provides 
the benefits of the drug in question with lesser medical risks, no reasonable 
medical provider would prescribe the drug in question." James A. Hender-
son,Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, The Products Liability Restatement in the Courts: An 
Initial Assessment, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 7, 26 & n.64 (2000). 
275. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 6(d) (1). 
276. See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264, 1271 (5th Cir. 1974); Davis v. 
Wyeth Lab., 399 F.2d 121, 131 (9th Cir. 1968). 
277. 734 A.2d 1245 (NJ. 1999). 
278. See, e.g., Webb v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 692 A.2d 343,348 (Vt. 1996) 
(discussing the Restatement (Third) in considering whether to adopt compar-
ative fault). 
279. See Sternhagen v. Dow Co., 935 P.2d 1139, 1142 (Mont. 1997) (holding 
state-of-the-art evidence irrelevant and inadmissible in a strict liability prod-
ucts claim despite recognition of the defense in the preliminary version of 
the Restatement (Third) draft). 
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to remain with regard to abandonment of the consumer-expectation 
test and adoption of the reasonable alternative design requirement in 
defective design cases.280 
The sophisticated user defense promotes an efficient communica-
tion system, encouraging manufacturers to provide adequate warnings 
to immediate purchasers by placing the duty to warn ultimate users on 
the party most likely to be aware of dangers and best able to warn. If 
the policy goal is to prevent workplace injuries, the sophisticated user 
and bulk supplier defenses should be accepted as consistent with case 
law and reflective of industrial realities. The failure to adopt these 
doctrines would result in the imposition of liability on manufacturers 
for workplace injuries that only the sophisticated user or employer 
could prevent, thereby elevating manufacturers to the status of insur-
ers of product safety. Implementing these theories promotes appro-
priate standards for reasonable product safety. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The issuance of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability 
mandates a re-examination of Maryland products liability doctrine, in-
cluding product-warning cases. In the warning arena, the related, but 
distinct, defenses of the bulk supplier, sophisticated user, and learned 
intermediary are central doctrines. 281 
Product manufacturers and suppliers must be required to commu-
nicate safety information about their products to product users and 
consumers. To be effective, this safety information may be conveyed 
directly to end-users or it may be conveyed through intermediaries.282 
Warning through intermediaries is often less expensive and more ef-
fective than direct warnings. 
The development of the bulk supplier, sophisticated user, and 
learned intermediary defenses has clarified the obligations and rights 
of manufacturers and end-users in the products liability arena. The 
evolving case law and the Restatement (Third) are steps in the right di-
rection as they encourage product manufacturers to place safer prod-
280. Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1331 (Conn. 1997) 
(refusing to abandon the consumer-expectation test and to adopt the rea-
sonable alternative design requirement). "[T] he fundamental tenet is that 
a manufacturer should be allowed to rely upon certain knowledgeable indi-
viduals to whom it sells a product to convey to the ultimate users warnings 
regarding any dangers associated with the product." TMJ Implants Prod. 
Liab. Litig., 872 F. Supp. 1019, 1029 (D. Minn. 1995); see also Reiff v. Con-
vergent Techs., 957 F. Supp. 573, 581-82 (D. NJ. 1997) (holding no duty to 
warn about the physical manipulation inherent in the use of certain ob-
jects, such as computer keyboard repetitive stress injuries, which can cause 
injury to some users). 
28l. See supra Part II.D. 
282. See supra Part II.D.3. 
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ucts in the market. 283 An adequately warned customer makes more 
informed product decisions. In the final analysis, the purpose of both 
Maryland case law and the Restatement (Third) is identical-promotion 
of appropriate standards for product safety through effective commu-
nication of product information. 
283. See supra Part V. 
